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1. Introduction
Since the unification of the country, in Italy the North-South divide has been
widely debated; not least, because of the sheer size of population affected, of the pro-
found differences in social condition, as well as of the ways the political unification
had taken place.1 The Questione meridionale (the problem of the South) arose simul-
taneously with the creation of the new unitary State, and soon, since the last decades
of the nineteenth century, imposed itself to the attention of scholars and policy
makers: regional policies especially designed to develop southern Italy began relat-
ively early, as compared to other advanced countries, inspired and carried out by
prominent figures as Francesco Saverio Nitti (who was also prime minister). 2 Despite
this, almost unanimously it is believed that, in the ninety years running from the uni-
fication of the peninsula until the end of the post-war reconstruction, North-South di -
vide progressively widened. ‘Italy’ − in Lloyd Saville’s words − ‘is plagued by this
dichotomy.’3
Actually, the policies carried out in the last phase of liberal Italy marked the be -
ginning of modern industry in the South;4 however, they were limited to specific
areas and sectors. By far more substantial and incisive was instead the ‘extraordinary
intervention’ that began after World War II and, for the most part, coincided with the
life span of the ‘Cassa per il Mezzogiorno’ (1950-1984). After concentrating on agri-
culture and infrastructure in the first decade,5 since the late 1950s it turned increas-
ingly towards industry and in particular, in the 1960s, towards the most capital-in-
tensive sectors. Actually, we should acknowledge that, since the 1960s, regional
policies were implemented in several Western European countries; 6 however, if we
1 Felice, Perché il Sud, 17−90.
2 Barone, Mezzogiorno; Lepore, La questione meridionale; Felice, Divari regionali, 65−71.
3 Saville, Regional Economic Development, 7.
4 De Benedetti, “Il sistema,” 577; Lepore, “Per una storia”.
5 Carey and Carey, “The South;” Carlyle, The Awakening.
6 For instance in France, in the Federal Republic of Germany, in the United Kingdom; but also in
smaller countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands. For an extensive comparative
analysis, see Yuill, Allen and Hull (eds.), Regional Policy; see also Artobolevskiy, Regional Policies.
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had to judge them by the range of sectors covered and the amount of resources chan -
nelled, in their times the activity of the Cassa and the extraordinary intervention as a
whole have no parallels in the European context.7 This can be true also for what con-
cerns the results achieved, both for the negative effects (in the long term) and the
positive results. The debate about state intervention in southern Italy also has a long
history − almost like the one about the Questione meridionale − with prominent
scholars, both Italian and non-Italian, involved in it: already in the 1950s the activity
of the new-born Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, then overwhelmingly concentrated on ag-
riculture and infrastructures, was reviewed either as an unprecedented modernization
step,8 or as being sluggish and ineffective;9 the subsequent top-down industrial
strategy was first discussed, either favourably10 or unfavourably,11 as early as by the
beginning of the 1960s. Since then, the debate has been going on for decades − and
we will recall at least a part of it. When looking at the performance of southern Italy
in the long run, the available, updated macro-economic figures indicate that the only
period of convergence of this area towards the Italian and European average took
Since the launch of the economic liberalization plan (1959), also the Spanish government under
Franco tried to promote regional industrialization through a ‘growth pole’ policy, with mixed results in
the long-run: De la Torre and García-Zúñiga, “El impacto a largo plazo”; “Was it a Spanish miracle?”,
179−180. Since 1958, also the European Union (former European Community) devoted increasing −
and since the 1980s considerable − resources to regional development: Vanhove, Regional Policy,
460. 
7 For a broad evaluation with respect to the other regional economic policies of the former European
Community, see Ronzani, “Regional Incentives,” 153−156. For a more detailed comparison with the
United Kingdom, see Felice, “Le politiche economiche.” 
8 Carey and Carey, “The South.” 
9 Concerning agriculture, see in particular Sereni, Due linee, 23−35 and 165−182; Rossi-Doria, crit-
ical in many aspects towards the land reform financed through the Cassa (e.g. Dieci Anni, 135−146),
nonetheless regarded it as ‘substantially fair’ (p. 135) and acknowledged its ‘great benefits’ (p. 136).
For the need of a different strategy more focused on industry, see above all Saraceno, “Lo sviluppo in-
dustriale;” see also section §3.
10 Chenery, Politiche, 17−19 and 38−47.
11 Lutz, Italy, above all 98−129.
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place from 1951 to 1973,12 that is at the same time when the activity of the Cassa was
more efficient and successful: according to Martinez Oliva, in those years the con-
vergence of southern Italy (towards the Centre-North) was faster than the one ob-
served in eastern Germany after 1995 (towards western Germany), the higher shares
of resources on GDP invested by the German Federal Government nonetheless.13
Later on, since the oil shocks, public intervention in the South gradually lost mo-
mentum14 and effectiveness (up to the point that, in the long run, it even turned out to
be counterproductive);15 at the same time, southern Italy began to fall back once
again, from the Italian and European average, and since then it never recovered;
among the Western countries of the European Union, at the present Italy is the only
one to have a large portion of it (most of the Mezzogiorno) still belonging to the ‘less
developed regions’ (GDP per head below 75% of the Europe-27 average; the rest of
the Mezzogiorno are transitional regions, with a GDP per head between 75% and
90% of the EU-27 average).16 
Despite the obvious importance of these issues,17 at the present the possible link
between the activities of the Cassa and the convergence of southern regions − or the
lack of it − has not been thoroughly investigated, not at the macro-economic level,
neither from the perspective of business history.18 The present article aims to move
12 Felice, “Regional value added;” Felice and Vecchi, “Italy’s Growth;” see also Daniele and
Malanima, “Il prodotto.”
13 Martinez Oliva, “Riunificazione intertedesca,” 22−23.
14 According to Anna Spadavecchia (“Regional and National”), from the mid-1970s onwards the
main beneficiary of subsidized credit to industry became the North of the peninsula.  
15 As did the more consistent expenditures from the ordinary administration: E.g. Trigilia, Sviluppo,
55−72 and 170−175.
16 Concerning the eligibility for 2014-2020 structural funds, below the 75% threshold are Campania,
Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily; Abruzzi, Molise and Sardinia are between 75 and 90%. See the
map in the website of the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/what/fu-
ture/img/eligibility20142020.pdf.
17 E.g. Galasso, “L’interesse storico.”
18 In international publications, comparative and comprehensive works on industrial or regional
policies in Italy, either devote a few pages to the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, insightful nonetheless (Fe-
derico and Giannetti, “Italy”), or provide a very broad overview of its activity as one − although the
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the first steps on this promising line of research, by analysing the annual reports of
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, which thus far have been never studied in detail
neither brought to the attention of an international journal. It provides the first com-
prehensive reconstruction of the extraordinary intervention, for the whole of southern
Italy and its regions, and discusses the results by the light of the most updated figures
of investments and GDP. Our article also aims to contribute originally to a growing
and recent literature about the business history of contemporary Italy, which is re-in-
terpreting the main features of Italian capitalism by combining qualitative analysis
and quantitative evidence with the avail of original datasets.19 
The paper is organized as follows. Section §2 introduces the Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno, outlines its evolution by focusing on the decision-making mechanisms
and its operational functioning: as we shall see, these issues are crucial in order to
understand the rise and the subsequent decline of public intervention in southern
Italy. Section §3 sketches out the main phases of the extraordinary intervention. Tak -
ing advantage of Cassa’s annual reports, section §4 reconstructs the yearly amounts
of the Cassa’s funds by main expenditures, while §5 goes more in depth at the re -
gional level. A comprehensive review of the regional policies for the South is
offered, which allows for both the differences in historical periods and the peculiarit -
ies of the regional paths.
most important − of the various instruments of regional incentives (Ronzani, “Regional Incentives”);
other more detailed works only focus on limited periods (Carey and Carey, “The South;” Carlyle, The
Awakening) or specific sectors (Spadavecchia, “Regional and National”). Limitedly to the Italian
reader a few histories of the extraordinary intervention in the South are available (Cafiero, and Mar -
ciani, “Quarant’anni;” Cafiero, Storia; Felice, Divari regionali; Lepore, “La valutazione;” Felice and
Lepore, “Le politiche di sviluppo”; Aa.Vv., La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and, more specifically
therein, Giannola, “La Cassa;” Santillo, “La messa in opera;” Bernardi, “Meridionalismo;” Zoppi,
“Traguardi raggiunti;” Felice and Lepore, “Intervento pubblico”), although a complete reconstruction
of the Cassa’s yearly activities by sectors and regions has not been provided so far, neither it has been
contrasted with the various performances of the southern regions – this is true also for our last work in
Italian (Felice and Lepore, “Intervento pubblico”), which puts forward some ideas of this article, but
in a far less developed form and without the support of a detailed sectoral and regional analysis.
19 See Rinaldi and Vasta, “The Italian Corporate Network;” Toninelli and Vasta, “Opening the black
box.”
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2. The ‘Cassa per il Mezzogiorno’: from autonomy to political
subordination
After World War II and the Reconstruction, the ruling class of the new-born re -
public put the underdevelopment of the South at the top of their agenda. Prominent
figures were now actively engaged, in various ways, in promoting the convergence of
the South, coming from different cultural backgrounds such as the social Christian
(Saraceno, Campilli, Mattei, Paronetto, Pastore, Vanoni), the liberal-nationalist and
republican (Giordani, Mattioli, Menichella), but also the Action party (La Malfa),
and the Socialist (Morandi); some (Cenzato, Paratore, again Menichella), in the top
management of state-owned enterprises such as IRI and SME, were among those lib-
eral technocrats promoted by Francesco Saverio Nitti − and whose major figure was
Alberto Beneduce − who had lived through and survived fascist dictatorship. The
Svimez, the Association for the industrial development of southern Italy founded in
1946 and led by some of the personalities above (Cenzato, Giordani, Menichella,
Morandi, Paratore, Saraceno), had in its executive board also prominent foreign eco-
nomists such as Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (chief of the Economic Department of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), Jan Tinbergen (president
of the European Coal and Steel Community commission for the European market),
Robert Marjolin (Oecd general secretary).20 The project for the establishment of a
‘Cassa for extraordinary works of public interest in the South’ was drafted by the
governor of the Bank of Italy Donato Menichella, who among other things had also
drafted the new Italian Banking Law (1936) and had been CEO of IRI, and by the
Neapolitan scientist Francesco Giordani, in the past president of IRI and of the Na -
tional Research Council;21 the original idea must probably be credited to Raffaele
Mattioli (‘the fabulous Italian banker’, as the Americans had written about him), who
was CEO and president of the most important Italian private bank ( Banca commer-
20 E.g. D’Antone, “«Straordinarietà»,” 595−694.
21 Saraceno, “Intervista.”
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ciale italiana) from 1933 to 1972, and who at the end of 1946 had proposed to use
the revenues from the sale of the goods supplied by UNRRA for the establishment of
a new financial institution, dedicated to promote the development of the South: an
agency with a high degree of organizational and planning autonomy, and mainly fo-
cused on productive investments.22 The project was passed by the Italian Parliament
with the law no. 646 of August 10, 1950. With it, the policy of ‘extraordinary inter -
vention’ officially took off. 
The Casmez was an autonomous body with legal personality and a specific ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, which embraced over the seven Southern regions (later become
eight: Abruzzo and Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and
Sardinia), plus some territories of Latium (provinces of Latina and Frosinone, and
several municipalities in the provinces of Rome and Rieti) and other more limited
areas in the Marches (the zone of Ascoli Piceno) and Tuscany (islands of Elba, Giglio
and Capraia) (Figure 1). These boundaries will remain practically unchanged
throughout the forty years of extraordinary intervention, surviving even to the trans -
formation, with the law n. 64 of 1986, of the Cassa in Agensud (1986-1992). Within
them, however, some areas benefiting from particular interventions were to stand
out: since the beginning the ‘districts of reclamation’, later above all, with the 1957
(no. 634) and 1959 (no. 555) laws, the ‘nuclei of industrialization’ and ‘areas of in -
dustrial development’; with the five-year plan of the second half of the sixties (1965
law, no. 1965), the ‘districts of tourism development’ and the ‘areas of particular de -
pression’ were added too.23
[Figure 1 here]
During its first years, the new institute enjoyed a remarkable autonomy, both in
the planning of initiatives and in the distribution of funds. The reference model on
22 Cafiero, “Menichella”; Lepore, “Il dilemma;” Costabile, “Alle origini.”
23 For a detailed picture, see: Giovannelli, L’organizzazione; Presidenza del consiglio dei ministri
L’intervento straordinario; Annesi and Claroni, La nuova disciplina.
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this was the American Tennessee Valley Authority,24 created in 1933 to build infra-
structures (drainage, irrigation, hydropower) in the Tennessee river system, and to
which Mattioli explicitly referred. The American influence was also more tangible.
For the start of the Cassa, which initially was provided with 1,000 billion historical
lire (around 18 billion 2011 euros),25 the financing from the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was decisive;26 the IBRD aids were gran-
ted on the condition that their administration was not entrusted to bureaucratic bodies
permeable to political pressure, but to a special entity that would operate under the
supervision of the IBRD itself.27 In this respect, Gabriele Pescatore − who was to
serve as president of the Cassa from 1955 to 1976 − emphasized as the Governor of
the Bank of Italy saw (…) the Cassa as ‘the most suitable instrument for realizing the
most significant intervention (...) the World Bank ever carried out in Europe’, mostly
thanks to its autonomy and technical expertise.28 This latter was a fundamental ‘ex-
ternal constraint’, which had to guarantee the independence of decisions from polit -
ical interference. To this condition, two more had to follow: the speed of implement-
ation and, of course, the fact that the new interventions had to be not substitutive but
rather additional – ‘extraordinary’, in fact – to the ordinary intervention carried out
by the State administration. 
By functioning under these constraints, the Cassa in the 1950s has been favour-
ably regarded by foreign observers. Writing in 1953, Stuart Hughes defined it as ‘the
24 Lepore, “Cassa per il Mezzogiorno e politiche per lo sviluppo,” 115−116.
25 Here, as in all the other cases where historical lire are converted to 2011 euros, our calculations
from the price indices in Istat, “Il valore.”
26 Lepore, La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno e la Banca Mondiale.
27 Barucci, Ricostruzione; D’Antone, “L’«interesse straordinario»”; Lepore, “La valutazione”; Id., “Il
divario”.
28 Pescatore, “Menichella,” 139. As the IBRD noted, ‘The Cassa was created as an autonomous
agency in order to guarantee the availability of funds on a fixed schedule and to expedite the program
to the maximum extent possible within the means available to it. In the Cassa law an attempt is made
to eliminate bureaucratic and other delays in the execution of the works’  (International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, An Appraisal, 3).
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most encouraging thing going on in Italy today’.29 Just two years later, Carey and
Carey described a Mezzogiorno which was ‘beginning to awaken from its long slum-
ber of underdevelopment and depression’ and stressed as for this result the work of
the Cassa could not ‘be under estimated’.30 The two authors did not hide themselves
the obstacles the Cassa had to overcome − mainly due to the lack of cooperation
from the ordinary administrations or to the fact that at the local level public agencies
lacked personnel or technical equipment − but they noticed as the Cassa managed to
overcome them by effectively working as an extraordinary agency: to bypass fric-
tions with ministries, it went ahead with construction even before the requisite per -
mission had been granted; in order to properly plan the works and cope with possible
difficulties at the local level, it set up its own technical bureaus, 31 which indeed
turned out to be quite successful (for instance, in the aqueducts and irrigation sys-
tems).32 Furthermore, the Cassa endowed itself with an organization which effect-
ively facilitated this autonomy: it concentrated its administrative centers in the cap -
ital, Rome, in order to avoid local pressures; in its first year of life, it made remark -
able efforts in order to hire the best technicians and employees, more than 200 by
June 1951 which were screened from thousands of applications ad permanently em-
ployed after a period of trial.33 
As a consequence, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno came to be equipped with an ef-
fective organizational structure, formed by highly qualified technicians (agronomists,
geologists, architects, surveyors and, mostly, engineers). The reason why an institu -
tion essentially of a financial nature had need for technical experts in reclamation and
water projects, as well in other infrastructural projects, consisted in the lack of these
skills within the ordinary administration:34 the Cassa had to make up for such a lack
29 Stuart Hughes, The United States, 211.
30 Carey and Carey, “The South,” 569 and 583 respectively. 
31 Ibid., 579−581. Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1950-51, 18−20; Id., Bilancio 1951−52, XV-
XXVI, XXXV-XXXVIII, XLVII−XLVIII, LIII−LIV; Id., Programma quinquennale, 238 and passim. 
32 Id., Programma per l’esercizio 1962-63, 158−183 and Id., Dodici anni. For Abruzzi and Molise,
see also Felice, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, 115−151. 
33 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1950-51, 2−4.
34 Petriccione, “La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno,” 310.
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of planning and implementation capacity with its own staff, in order to provide tech-
nical assistance together with the financing of projects. The important role played by
the technicians in the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was witnessed, among the others, by
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: ‘The Cassa staff, espe -
cially the chiefs of the four principal technical services, have a high professional
standing. In general the impression has been that the Italian engineers and techni-
cians fully measure up to the technical problems involved in carrying out the Plan’. 35
Still in 1973, in the Cassa’s staff there were 213 technicians − 149 engineers, 43 ag -
ronomists, 8 surveyors, 7 geologists, 3 architects, and 3 unspecified − out of 2780
total employees. 36 
To this picture, it may be worth adding that cronyism, as a way of establishing
and consolidating political power, at least in the 1950s still was not a pervasive as -
35 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Italy, 10. On the links between the IBRD
and the Cassa, see among the others the case of David Lilienthal, president of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, who from 1956 was also an advisor of the Cassa and significantly contributed to the exten -
sion of the ‘grass root administration’ model to Italy: Grandi, “Una TVA per il Mezzogiorno,” 215;
Selznick, Tva and the Grass Roots.
36 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Ruolo di anzianità del personale, 351. By that time, at the top of the
Cassa’s organization there was a directorate, supervising the following functions: aqueducts and sew -
ers; reclamation; industry (areas and industrial centers); roads and civil constructions; tourism, crafts
and fishing; vocational education; credit and finance, plans and programs; organization and data pro-
cessing; inspection; general affairs; accountancy; staff. Also, there were some offices located in the
southern regions for the management of water supplies or for some particular interventions (office for
the management of dams and large galleries, special office for the law for Naples). On January 1,
1973, as mentioned the staff employed amounted to 2780 units, composed as follows: 1 general man-
ager; 276 senior staff units in the administrative role; 213 senior staff units in the technical role; 495
general staff units in the administrative role; 520 general staff units in the technical role; 406 execut -
ive staff units in the administrative role; 160 executive staff units in the technical role; 71 auxiliary
staff units in the administrative role; 74 auxiliary staff units in the technical role; 564 salaried staff
units (first, second and third category workers in the maintenance of the southern aqueducts). The
94% of the employees in the administrative role and the 96% of those in the technical role held a de-
gree. Of course high professionals were also in the board of directors: from 1950 to 1984, out of the
74 board members 26 were professors, 17 engineers, 17 graduated technicians, 15 lawyers. See ACS
(Archivio Centrale dello Stato), Piano esecutivo, 19−20.
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pect of the southern Italy’s political life − it would have begun to spread from the
agrarian sector, indeed, to progressively cover other areas such as industry and wel-
fare, but only later on (starting with a 1959 law in favour of small farming property
and then, above all, in the 1970s and 1980s).37 As far as we know, the Cassa’s activity
in agriculture was, in broad terms, free from cronyism and personal political pres-
sures38 − although these may have played some role under specific circumstances and
in particular marginal territories.39
In the actual operating of the agency, however, independence and technical capa -
city could not be maintained in the long run. After an initial and not short phase − ap-
proximately fifteen years − when they were effectively respected, they came to be
progressively abandoned. Autonomy from the policy was gradually called into ques-
tion and then seriously hampered with the law no. 717 of 1965, which set forth the
obligation to submit the Cassa’s programs for approval to the Minister for extraordin-
ary interventions in the South; furthermore, according to the 1965 law the Minister
would also have supervised the activities of the agency, having the power to declare
its dissolution ‘in case of reiterated non-compliance with its guidelines’.  As pointed
out by Cafiero, ‘almost all the Ministers for extraordinary interventions in the South
would have tended to use their legal powers in a particularly invasive way’.40 
37 Bottiglieri, La politica economica, 299−306; Ginsborg, Storia d’Italia, 186−187; Zamagni, Dalla
periferia al centro, 442−445.
38 This may be true also for what concerns the role of organized crime in that period. It is significant
that Danilo Dolci, probably the most critical voice in Sicily against the Cassa’s strategy, and surely the
most perceptive in describing as early as in the 1950s the intertwining of the local ruling Christian
Democratic party with the mafia (even at the cost of his personal freedom), did not point to a connec-
tion between the Cassa’s activity in the agrarian reform and mafia’s interests. Rather, by Dolci the
Cassa was seen as an external modernization lever, from the Italian state, whose main problem in his
eyes was, indeed, to have come too late and too slowly. Dolci, Spreco; but see also, for a recent re-
appraisal of Dolci’s political and social activism, Costantino and Zanca (eds.), Una Sicilia senza.
39 For instance, in the poorest mountain villages of the province of Chieti: in the case of Fraine, it is
reported that in the 1950s people changed affiliation from the Communist Party to the national ruling
Christian Democrats, in the hope to get a job from the Cassa. ASC (Archivio di Stato di Chieti), Pref.,
Gab., b. 12.
40 Cafiero, “Menichella,” 512.
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In the early seventies, following the establishment of the regions and the increas-
ing fragmentation in the process of decision-making, the propelling phase of the
Cassa came to an end. Degenerative tendencies expanded, so as that Salvatore
Cafiero dubbed this period ‘the long agony of the extraordinary intervention’.41 In
fact, the new-established regions greatly increased political influence over the Cassa,
by directly intervening in the planning and carrying out of the projects, and by pro-
gressively replacing the Cassa’s technicians with their own local bureaucracy (often
selected through political loyalty). The distortions grew pathologically in the second
half of the seventies and then especially in the next decade, ‘the darkest period in the
recent history of the South’,42 when the share of income transfers − to sustain living
conditions in the short run − had definitely overtaken that of investments. The more
and more frequent interferences from the polity on the choices of the Cassa (as well
as on those of State-owned enterprises),43 even on the most technical ones, un-
doubtedly made the agency lose those ‘qualities of technical and strategic initiative,
and efficiency, that [...] had characterized its works in the fifties and sixties’.44 The
principle of complementariness with respect to the normal administration of the State
also was abandoned, so that Cafiero and Marciani called ‘de facto ineffectual’ the co-
ordination between the extraordinary and the ordinary interventions;45 it went this
way despite a Committee of Ministers for the Mezzogiorno was set up, with the spe-
cific task of coordinating the activities of the Cassa with those of the ministries com -
posing the Committee. The main result of such a lack of complementariness was, in
the absence of some ‘ordinary’ strategy for the South, the transformation of the ex-
traordinary intervention from ‘additional’ to ‘substitutive’, with respect to the actions
the State should normally have taken. The increasingly inadequacy of the latter, more
patent through time, in tackling a number of problems that often required quick and
41 Cafiero, Questione meridionale, 207.
42 Viesti, Abolire, 60.
43 See Felice (“State Ownership”) for the case of Finmeccanica. According to Colli (“Coping with the
Leviathan,” 206−207), political dominance also went to the detriment of the rights of private minority
shareholders.
44 Cafiero, Questione meridionale, 211.
45 Cafiero and Marciani, “Quarant’anni,” 251.
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reliable answers, gradually led to charge the Cassa with numerous tasks in many dif-
ferent fields, often with mere welfare purposes. This had serious consequences. In its
early stages the agency, thanks to its financial and technical support to the peripheral
administrations of the South,46 contributed to the raise of local efficiency and to the
functional improvement of the ordinary administration.47 With time, however, its
activity − as coming from above, and losing in linearity and transparency − ended up
with favouring the collapse, or at least the deteriorating, of such capabilities, while
fostering instead a passive and parasite attitude. 
At the same time, the efforts of the State in the most productive area of regional
policy – the subsidies to industry – dramatically decreased in southern Italy as com-
pared to other parts of the country. This shift comes out quite clearly when we con-
sider all the types of industrial (regional and national) schemes which were set up by
the Italian government at different times: for what regards subsidized medium-term
credit to industry, for instance, Spadavecchia has showed that the Mezzogiorno was
the main beneficiary from 1957 to 1975, i.e. when the Cassa was more clearly fo -
cused on industrial development, as compared to the North-East/Centre and the
North-West,; but also that, since 1975 until the end of the extraordinary intervention
(1992), it was overcome by both the other two macro-areas.48 Furthermore, as argued
by Trigilia, in this period even industrial aids to the South were counter-productive,
as long as they provided the wrong incentives (to get funds from the Cassa without
bothering for economic rationale) to local entrepreneurs.49 As we will see, a period of
46 This point was stressed also by the IBRD: ‘As a matter of policy, the Cassa does not directly ad-
minister any of its projects, but appoints existing agencies, called “concessionaires” for the detailed
planning and execution of each project. […] The Cassa intervention is therefore limited to general
guidance of the concessionaires, examination of the projects, review of the award of contracts and
general supervision.’ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Italy, 3.
47 Ibid., 7−12. D’Antone, “L’«interesse straordinario»,” 46−51; Petriccione, “La Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno,” 313−317.
48 The North-West and the North-East/Centre were the main beneficiaries also in the 1953-56 years,
that is when the extraordinary intervention was overwhelmingly focused on agriculture and infrastruc-
tures. Spadavecchia, “Regional and National,” 35 and 41.
49 Trigilia, Sviluppo, 93−94.
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− slow, but continued − divergence between southern Italy and the rest of the country
now began, a divergence which has been going on up to our days.
In order to understand how the change from a stimulating to a degenerative
period did occur, it is worth looking in more detail at the different phases the Cassa
lived through.
3. The ‘phases’ of the extraordinary intervention
The increase in the Cassa’s range of activities went together with changes in the
development strategy for southern Italy. By and large, the literature about the ex-
traordinary intervention agrees on dividing the period corresponding to the Italian
‘golden age’ into three different ‘phases’: pre-industrialization (1950-1957), industri-
alization (1958-1965), and the inclusion (or attempted inclusion) of the regional
policy into the national economic plans (1966-1970). For the next period, a useful
periodization is the one adopted by Cafiero and Marciani, who break up the seventies
in two five-year periods (1971-1975 and 1976-1980), the first characterized by the
onset of special projects and the second by the entry of the regions into the decision-
making process, then treat unitarily the short-term extensions of the Cassa’s lifespan,
the subsequent dissolution and the birth of Agensud (1980-1986), and finally con-
sider a three-year period (1987-1989) when the new agency was really operative.50
When the Cassa was created, in 1950, it was endowed with a first grant for a ten-
year plan of ‘consistent systems of extraordinary works’, after which the extraordin-
50 Cafiero and Marciani, “Quarant’anni.” Other periodizations have been proposed, though. Saraceno
(Il nuovo meridionalismo, 16) maintained that «the first thirty years of extraordinary intervention may
be divided into three phases: pre-industrialization (1951-1961), industrialization (1962-1974) and
stasis (1975-1983)». This periodization has the advantage of singling out the phase of greater indus -
trial engagement of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (1962-1974). Looking at the whole period of the ex -
traordinary intervention, a different periodization was put forward by Piccinetti (“The ‘Intervento
Straordinario’,” 6): «Pre-industrialisation policies (1950-57); the industrialisation policies (1957-74);
the transition decade (1974-1984) and finally the end and failure of the intervento straordinario
(1984-1992)».
15
ary intervention had to cease to exist (and the agency, too).  Up to 77% of amounts al-
located under the original 10-year plan had to go to agriculture (49%  for reclama-
tions, land improvements and mountain interventions, 28% for the land reform), 51 the
rest to aqueducts and drains (11%), ordinary roads (9%) and tourism (3%).52 But as
soon as with a 1952 law (no. 949), the Cassa’s budget was raised up from 1,000 to
1,280 billion lire (20 billion 2011 euros), and the life of the agency extended to
twelve years: the share of funds for agriculture had reduced to 71.1% (49.2% for re-
clamations, land improvements and mountain interventions; 21.9% for the land re-
form), while the one for civil infrastructures − the so-called ‘pre-conditions for in -
dustrialization’ − had correspondingly raised, with the significant, new inclusion of
railway works (5.9%; 11.7% of the funds were for aqueducts and drains, 9% for the
ordinary roads); tourism was down to 2.3%.53 
With the golden age and the Italian ‘big spurt’ to the status of industrial power, 54
the voices of those who, especially from the SVIMEZ, called for a direct involve -
ment of the Cassa in the creation of industrial factories became more incisive. 55 It is
51 The Cassa financially contributed to the construction of rural centers, buildings, storehouses and
other infrastructures in the land reform areas, as well as to works of land improvements under the land
reform program: Massullo, “La Cassa e la riforma agraria”; see also Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilan-
cio 1956-57, 49−51. For an outline of the land reform, which was launched in 1950 at the national
level but interested above all the Mezzogiorno, see: Marciani, L’esperienza; Ginsborg, Storia d’Italia,
160−187.
52 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1952-53, 16.
53 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1953-54, 22; Carlyle, The Awakening, 140.
54 E.g. Cohen and Federico, The Growth, 87−106; Toniolo, “An Overview,” 3−9 and 22−23; Felice
and Vecchi, “Italy’s Modern.”
55 As early as in 1948, actually, Corrado Barbagallo had pointed to the ‘industrial inferiority of south -
ern Italy’ as one of the major economic problems of the country: Barbagallo, La questione meridi-
onale, 173. According to Pasquale Saraceno, promoter and president of the SVIMEZ, the ‘new meridi-
onalism’ (nuovo meridionalismo) of this Association could be summarized in three basic axioms: a) no
significant problem of the Italian society can be effectively addressed, until when the problem of the
South remains unsolved; b) in order to solve it, the industrialization of the South is a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition; c) it is therefore in the interest of the whole country to put the indus -
trialization of the South at the top of political agenda. Saraceno stressed that this approach to the prob-
lem of the South was due to Rodolfo Morandi, dating back to the last chapter of his Storia della
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worth reminding that SVIMEZ, the Association for the Development of Industry in
the South which was created in 1946, had among its founders the same persons
(Pasquale Saraceno, Donato Menichella, Rodolfo Morandi, Francesco Giordani, Gi-
useppe Cenzato, Giuseppe Paratore and others) who also created the Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno.56 Consistently, industrialization in the South was viewed as the most
effective way to generate new jobs and to contrast mass emigration, and had to be en-
trusted to the new agency. Some steps had already been taken with a 1952 law (no.
166), which financed specific initiatives devoted to ‘facilitate the process of industri -
alization of the South’,57 and then with a 1953 law (no. 298), which ordered the re-
structuring or creation ex novo of three special credit institutions dedicated to
provide subsidized credit to the southern firms: Isveimer for continental South, Irfis
for Sicily and Cis for Sardinia. However, it was only with a 1957 law (no. 634), that
the so-called ‘second phase’ of the extraordinary intervention, characterized by a
strong reorientation of the Cassa’s funds in favour of the industrial sector, did begin.
The two instruments were low-interest loans and grants, in favour of those firms
which localized their plants in the South (another possible instrument, tax incentives,
were instead de facto ignored). Of course, with the 1957 law the agency was also sig-
nificantly re-funded, and its lifespan further extended up to 1965. 58 The new fifteen-
year plan (1950-65), drafted in 1957, confirmed this re-orientation toward infrastruc-
tures and industry: for all the fifteen years since the Cassa’s foundation, agriculture
had to shrink to 55.3%, followed by aqueducts and drains (15%) and then by trans-
port and communications (12.6%); fourth was industry (11.8%), then came tourism
(2.7%) and school and professional education (2.1%).59 
grande industria in Italia, published in 1931: Saraceno, “Morandi.”
56 E.g. Zamagni and Sanfilippo, Nuovo meridionalismo, 7−51; Novacco, Per il Mezzogiorno;
Cafiero, Tradizione e attualità, 42−44, 65−69 and 95−97; Lepore, “Cassa per il Mezzogiorno e
politiche per lo sviluppo,” 109−116; Lepore, “Il dilemma”, 65−82; Zoppi, Una lezione di vita.
57 Croce, “Il credito industriale,” 619.
58 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. L’intervento straordinario, 66−68; Podbielski, Venticinque
anni, 48.
59 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1957-58, 13−15; Carlyle, The Awakening, 140.
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We will see in the next section how much these goals − and these shares − were
respected. Here it must be added that a subsequent law issued in 1965 (no. 717), be-
sides extending the life of the Cassa until 1980, also prescribed the formulation of a
‘multi-year coordination plan’, aiming at linking the regional policies for the South
to the emerging national planning.60 In this respect, the results were disappointing,
mainly due to the lack of coordination between national and regional policies.61
However, the sixties are above all the period in which the strategy for industrial -
ization actually took off. This strategy was devised as early as in the 1940s as a result
of the ‘big push’ approach of the time,62 and by that time was proving itself to be
quite effective in promoting industrialization in other underdeveloped countries; in
Italy, it had been endorsed by SVIMEZ since the late 1940s. The eligible territories
had to conform to some criterions: a pre-existing history of economic dynamism, the
existence of local players able to promote and implement a ‘broad economic and en -
vironmental transformation’, a good geographical position, as well as ‘an area suffi-
ciently large and homogeneous, made up of a certain number of municipalities
grouped around a main center.’63 Concerning the fourth condition, this strategy fo-
cused on the so-called ‘development poles’: ‘positive externalities similar to those in
the more developed regions of the country’ had to be created in these selected areas,
in order to ensure to the new factories ‘the proximity of complementary industries,
the availability of services and a well-diversified labour market’.64 The ‘areas of in-
dustrial development’ and the ‘nuclei of industrialization’ were created throughout
southern Italy, paying particular attention to demographic features: the area had to
have a population of at least 200,000 units, the nuclei, designed for home-grown
firms of smaller size, a population below 75,000. It was essentially a top-down
60 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1966, 7−19.
61 Cfr. Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1969, 3−13 (still relatively optimistic); Id., Bilancio 1970,
3 (already quite critical); Id., Bilancio 1971, 3−8; see also Cafiero, Questione meridionale, 188−192.
62 Rosenstein-Rodan, “Problems of Industrialization.”
63 Besusso, “Analisi e prospettive,” 116. Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1956-57, 165−166; Id.,
Bilancio 1957-58, 79−81; Id., Bilancio 1958-59, 130−137.
64 Podbielski, Venticinque anni, 46. Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1963-64, 197; Id., Bilancio
1964-65, 229. 
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model, based on industrial incentives and infrastructural investments, which was
meant to favour the installation − in clearly defined territories − of one or more ‘en -
gine firms’, usually large-sized ones. 
Initially, incentives were reserved to small firms, but then in 1962 limits on em-
ployees and fixed assets were lifted, in order to attract investments by large compan -
ies from the North.65 A special role was assigned to State-owned enterprises, which
were obliged by law to localize 60% of their investments in new plants and 40% of
their total assets in the South. As a consequence, the majority of the projects carried
out in the poles of development − but also the very few localized outside of them –
were in heavy, highly capital intensive industrial sectors: according to the Cassa’s re -
ports, by the end of 1970 roughly 60% of low-interest loans went to chemicals, me-
tallurgy and engineering (by the end of 1973, their share had risen up to 70%); for
what concerns the grants, these three sectors totalized 50% of the total (53.4% by the
end of 1973).66 According to Svimez, which focused on the investments above 100
billion lire of the time, from 1962 to 1968 40.5% of their amount went to chemicals,
21.5% to metallurgy (which had totalled barely 3.1% in the previous period) and
7.9% to engineering, for a total share of 69.9%; then 9.5 and 9.3% went to non-
metallic minerals and food and tobacco respectively, and the rest, 11,3%, to all the
remaining sectors (textiles, clothing, footwear, leather, wood and furniture, paper,
etc.).67 According to Del Monte and Giannola, in 1973 the state-owned enterprises
and the two largest private groups, Fiat and Montedison, accounted for more than
70% of the southern industrial workers and two-thirds of its industrial output.68 This
65 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1962-63, 57−59; Federico and Giannetti, “Italy,” 140.
66 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1970, 74 and 76; Id., Bilancio 1973, 48 and 50.
67 Heavy sectors, however, were already present in the previous decade, although not predominant.
From 1951 to 1961, in manufactures the investments above 20 billion lire of the time could be divided
as follows: 31.2% to chemicals, 21.2% to food and tobacco, 17.8% to non-metallic minerals, 11.5% to
engineering and transportation, 18.3% to the rest. Svimez, Gli investimenti industriali, 29.
68 Del Monte and Giannola, Il Mezzogiorno, table 8.11, 235; see also Federico and Giannetti, “Italy,”
140.
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too was in line with the ‘big push approach’, and with the mainstream economics at
that time.69 
The stagflation crisis of the ninety-seventies, and the consequent rise of a new
‘technological system’, with the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, affected
the heavy industries more severely in the Mezzogiorno, than in the Centre-North. It
must be pointed out that, meantime, the strategy of ‘engine firms’ had effectively
brought rapid industrialization in the Mezzogiorno and caused its unprecedented con-
vergence towards the Italian average: the ‘big push’ hoped for by Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan had become reality, in certain respects; and in any case, the early capital-in -
tensive big factories marked a significant step forward, being at the forefront of tech -
nological innovation.70 However, it is also true that the top-down strategy had pro-
duced little in terms of component industries and local industrial networks and that,
because of this, it had begun to be negatively considered in the new economic cli-
mate: the success of the expression ‘cathedrals in the wilderness’, which became
popular in the heated debate of the time, despite the caveats expressed about its ac-
curacy (and congruity with the deep economic transformation of the South),71 by it-
self can give an idea of how this strategy had come to be seen by a part of the public
opinion. At the same time, the creation of the regions (1970) entailed new and pro -
found legislative changes. A 1971 law (no. 853) concentrated the Cassa’s aids on in-
dustrial development and on the new ‘special projects of coherent interventions’. The
69 Fenoaltea, “I due fallimenti.” 
70 See Graziani, Lo sviluppo dell’economia italiana, 78. But see above all the analysis of the next
Section (§4). Here it is worth anticipating that, according to the last estimate available in the Cassa’s
yearly reports, the new employment created by the low-interest loans would have totalled 725 thou -
sand units, that is 44% − a remarkable share − of the total industrial employment of the southern re-
gions at the time of its maximum (1974, when it peaked 1635 thousand units according to CRENoS,
“Regio-It 1970-2004”); in both cases, these figures do not include the territories of Latium (128 thou-
sand industrial workers from the low-interest loans) and the Marches (11 thousand). Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1973, 47.
71 Saraceno, “Le cattedrali”; Castronovo, Storia economica, 432−435. But for a poignant criticism to
the image of ‘wilderness’, see Del Monte and Giannola, Il Mezzogiorno, 233, according to which in-
dustrial development in the South was the ‘algebraic sum’ between a modern and market-oriented sec -
tor and a more traditional, widespread and small-scale manufacturing of consumption goods. 
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former were now, basically, ‘individual incentives, being designed in such a way as
to allow for a highly discriminatory use to be made of them’. 72 The latter were an at-
tempt to recover the progressively lost ‘extraordinary’ characteristic of the agency, by
making profit of the technical capacities, industrial expertise and celerity the Cassa
had proved itself (and was still) capable of, unlike the ordinary administrations; how-
ever, now they had to be submitted for approval to the Minister for extraordinary in-
terventions in the South. According to the 1971 regulations, the regions had to substi-
tute the Cassa in all the areas that now fell under their competency: from agriculture
to road networks, from aqueduct to tourism; the Cassa, however, was allowed to go
on with its activity until the completion of the works already begun, which meant
that it actually could continue to work in these areas for most of the seventies.73 Quite
correctly, Ronzani has defined the Mezzogiorno legislation for the 1971-76 quin-
quennium as ‘probably one of the best Italian examples of “overloaded” policy’.74
Following a subsequent law in 1976 (no. 183), the participation of local authorit-
ies was further − and greatly − strengthened: to the regions were now assigned advis-
ory powers on all the legislative initiatives and decisions of the Committee of Minis -
ters for the Mezzogiorno; regional representatives were appointed to the Cassa’s ex-
ecutive board; a new area where the Cassa had to operate, the so-called ‘development
regional projects’, of specific interest to the regions, was established, to which 2,000
billion lire of the time (8.7 billion 2011 euros) were allocated.  75 These changes, how-
ever, instead of enhancing the involvement of the local entrepreneurship, in the ma-
jority of the cases − as noted by several scholars76 − only increased political pressure
and nepotism, and resulted into a further dispersion of resources towards unproduct -
ive expenditures. As Claudio Riolo has pointed out, from being a resource, whose
potential of convergence further increased the growth rate of Italy during the eco-
nomic miracle, southern Italy now became a cause of economic slowdown and rising
72 Ronzani, “Italy,” 140.
73 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1973…1978; Annesi, Nuove tendenze.
74 Ronzani, “Italy,” 140.
75 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1977, 19−26; Svimez, Il T. U. delle leggi.
76 Bevilacqua, Breve storia, 126−127; Cafiero, Questione meridionale, 211.
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public debt − although, until at least the early 1990s, this did not weaken the political
connivance between the ruling élites of the South and those of the North.77
The last deadline established for the Cassa’s lifespan was December 31, 1980.
When it was approaching, however, a number of short-time extension measures pro-
longed its life again and again, until when the Presidential decree of 6 August 1984
marked the final abolition of the agency. A few months earlier, the law no. 651, of
December 1 1983, had anticipated the new guidelines of the development policy for
southern Italy: a three-year program had to be drawn up by the Minister of the
Mezzogiorno, taking into account proposals coming from the regions.78 It is worth
noticing that all these laws placed great emphasis on the need to coordinate the or -
dinary activities with the extraordinary intervention. Once again, however, such a
goal remained by far unaccomplished. The ‘ordinary’ administrations and agencies
not only failed to reach the share of investment in the South (at least 40% out of the
total) they were obliged by the law, but they often did not even comply  with their
primary duty of reciprocal information, between them and in turn with the Cassa;
neither they respected the commitment to realize inter-regional projects of national
importance (on this, negatively affected by the lack of adequate technical support).
More generally, the years 1980 to 1986 saw a further rise in bureaucratic impedi -
ments, due first to the precariousness of the short-term extensions, then to the com-
plexity related to the drafting of the new legislation. 79 Uncertainty and the legal
tangle further complicated things. In fact, since 1980 (the year in which the Cassa’s
activities had to cease) eight decrees and two laws followed in just six years. At the
end of this phase, 1986 was intended to mark the passage from a top-down to a bot-
tom-up policy, but actually resulted into a further overlapping of functions and regu -
lations.80 To sum up, according to Salvatore Cafiero, ‘first the precariousness of the
extensions, then the suppression of the Cassa, which until then had retained respons-
77 Riolo, “Centralità del Mezzogiorno,” 85.
78 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1983, 22−27.
79 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1984. 1o gennaio – 31 luglio, 21−46; Id., Bilancio 1984. 1o
agosto − 31 dicembre, 19−35; Intervento straordinario nel Mezzogiorno, Commissario del Governo,
Bilancio 1985, 21−69; Id., Bilancio 1986, 25−67.
80 Ammassari, Legge e gestione amministrativa, 23.
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ibility for implementing the current regulations, negatively impacted upon the actual
functioning of the extraordinary intervention’.81
A more consistent legislative framework was re-established only in 1986, with
the law no. 64 which in fact bore the title ‘consistent legislation for the extraordinary
intervention’. At the same time, however, with the 1986 law the idea of one single
agency devoted to the development of the South was lost, definitely. The new ‘Agen-
sud’ had to limit itself to the disbursement of funds and to the participation in spe -
cific ‘promotion agencies’; several entities were entitled to ask for funds, from the
central government to the regions, from local bodies to State-owned agencies and
even to non-economic organizations, down to private entrepreneurs.82 In short, there
was no longer a single agency charged with the task of developing southern Italy;
this is the main reason why we have decided not to deal with this last phase of the
extraordinary intervention, preferring to consider only the (far more substantial)
period of the life of the Cassa (1950-1984), plus the two interim years (1985-1986)
before the Agensud (1986-1992).
4. ‘Cassa per il Mezzogiorno’ and convergence. A re-appraisal
Table 1 presents the yearly expenses of the ‘Cassa per il Mezzogiorno’, as a total
and as a percentage of investments and gross domestic product, 1951 to 1986; from
those figures, Figure 2 offers a clear vision of the trends of the different typologies of
expenses; Table 2 shows the allocation of the expenses for direct interventions,
through the years 1950−1975.83 The first thing worth noticing is that these data con-
firm only in part the strategic guidelines characterizing the different phases of the ex -
81 Cafiero, Questione meridionale, 213.
82 Annesi and Claroni, La nuova disciplina. See also Agenzia per la promozione dello sviluppo del
Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1987, 37−92.
83 For the subsequent years, an increasing share of the expenses went to the regional special projects,
which were intersectoral; because of this, the structure of the Cassa’s reports significantly changed, so
that it is not possible to reconstruct the sectoral amounts of direct interventions.
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traordinary intervention. It is true that a strong correspondence between the stated
goals and the actual expenses can be observed in the early years: from 1951 to 1957,
there is a clear prevalence of the funds for the works carried out directly by the
Cassa, mostly for agriculture, then for aqueducts and roads; the subsidized credit to
private entrepreneurs still appears to be very small, taking up less than 5% of the
total, to which we must also add a good share from the 10% of other interventions 84 −
a residual category including mostly the IBRD aids, which had been growing since
the mid-fifties and had touched the highest levels with the first years of the industrial
development strategy.85 If, broadly speaking, until 1957 the Cassa’s focus was on ag-
riculture and the pre-requisites of industrialization, and later it shifted towards infra-
structures and industry, this is what results from the actual amounts of the expenses −
and even beyond what was originally planned. According to Table 2, actually from
1950 to 1965 the share of agriculture was even smaller than what designed by the
new fifteen-years plan (55%, see previous section): a little above 50% of total direct
interventions, which meant roughly 36% of total expenses.86
In part overlapping with the fifteen-year plan, the longer phase of industrializa-
tion, 1958 to 1970, also saw a substantial reduction in the percentage of funds to the
works carried out directly by Cassa, which practically halved (from 85% in 1951-57
to 42% in 1966-70), although mainly due to the decrease of the agricultural sector.87
In contrast, subsidies to private investments − industrial, for a vast majority − re-
markably grew, especially in the second half of the sixties, when this sector reached
an average of one third of the total, with peaks above 40% (in 1970). 88 This level re-
mained unchanged even in the first half of the seventies, mainly due to the fact that,
especially at this stage, expenses followed commitments with a lag of one or even a
few years, and thus they still reflected the commitments contracted in the previous
84 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1950-51…1957-58.
85 Lepore, La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno e la Banca Mondiale.
86 To this, a small share of grants and soft loans should also be added; but these grew noteworthy only
from 1960 onwards, when the percentage of those going to agriculture became negligible. Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1950-51…II semestre 1965.
87 Id., Bilancio 1950-51…1970.
88 Id., Bilancio 1970, 342−349.
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phase.89 Even in this respect, therefore, we may say that the  agency complied with its
stated goals. 
In the seventies, however, the share of works carried out directly by the Cassa,
which now included also minor interventions, returned to rise, and in a significant
way.90 This is one of the two major discrepancies with the stated goals of extraordin -
ary intervention. In spite of the legislator’s intentions, the implementation of special
projects and the passage of many functions to the regions (with the exception of the
programs already begun by the Cassa), did not reduce the flow of large sums to direct
interventions. Furthermore, this is not the only matter of importance. The second ma-
jor discrepancy is that in this period all the expenditures for regional policy did in-
crease, both in absolute terms and relatively to GDP.91
By this regard, Table 1 and Figure 2 show that, while in the fifties and sixties the
yearly expenses had remained below 0.7% of the Italian GDP, in the next decade
their share rose to an average 0.9%, with peaks of more than 1% between 1975 and
1977. The percentages reached in the seventies cannot be interpreted merely in terms
of a lag to the commitments of the sixties, but they should be rather seen in relation
to the economic downturn which followed the first oil shock, whose most acute
phase occurred in the mid of that decade. The economic hardships were felt more
severely in southern Italy, and frustrated the industrial development which had begun
in the sixties. In turn, the growing difficulties resulted into an increase of help re-
quests from the disadvantaged areas, and these requests were met by the political
power: the total amount of aids also grew, but − in the lack of an alternative develop -
ment model, at least in the short run − they mainly went to unproductive uses and in-
discriminate interventions.92 
89 E.g. Id., Bilancio 1975. I. Relazione, 3−11 and 51−67 and Bilancio 1975. II. Appendice statistica,
209−223.
90 Id., Bilancio 1971…1980.
91 Besides the data from the Cassa’s yearly reports (Id., Bilancio 1977. Appendice statistica,
176−189; Id., Bilancio 1978, 57−11; Id., Bilancio 1979, 87−122; Id., Bilancio 1980, 93−127), on this
point see also Allen, Bachtler and Yuill, “Un confronto,” 621.
92 Together with a vast literature (e.g. Trigilia, Dinamismo privato, 748−750), this is somehow ac-
knowledged also in the Cassa’s reports, for instance when making reference to the remarkable addi-
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The precariousness of the first half of the eighties resulted into a decrease of
funds, but this indeed was more in relative terms, i.e. compared to GDP which was
rising again, than in absolute ones: as shown again in Table 1, from 1981 to 1986 the
average level of expenditures was below that of the years 1976 to 1980, but similar
to that of 1971-1975. Above all, it must be noticed as the share of direct interventions
− basically infrastructural works − continued to increase, reaching an annual average
72.8%; this contrasts with the decline in subsidies to private investments, which fell
below 20%.93 As pointed out by Barbagallo and Bruno, ‘these policies have had a
positive impact on the demand side, at least in the short term, but did not prove them-
selves capable of changing the structural conditions of inefficiency and low pro-
ductivity present in the supply side’; not least, because they were strongly condi-
tioned by their ‘indirect effects’, which in turn were ‘nourished by the chronic ineffi-
ciency of the public administration’ and eventually compromised the results.94 
[Table 1 here]
[Figure 2 here]
[Table 2 here]
By this perspective, the negative turn in the extraordinary intervention which
took place at the beginning of the seventies emerges clearly: the extraordinary inter -
vention came to be more and more affected by the demands of the regions and local
political powers, in sharp contrast with the technocratic management carried out dur -
ing the first phase of the Cassa’s activity. However, it is also true that, throughout the
tional expenditures observed in sectors which had been handed over to the regions (e.g. Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1977, 22).  
93 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1981…1984; the share of grants and soft loans rose again
above 20% in 1985 and 1986 (Intervento straordinario nel Mezzogiorno, Commissario del Governo,
Bilancio 1985, 113−125, and Bilancio 1986, 195−211), although its yearly average for the years 1980-
86 remained below that threshold (Table 1).
94 Barbagallo and Bruno, “Espansione e deriva,” 468.
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period of our concern, the effort in financial terms was remarkable, indeed, much
more than what can be observed in the regional policies of other countries, for in -
stance in the United Kingdom.95 Such financial effort can be further appreciated if we
look at its share of total gross investments in the Mezzogiorno (see again Table 1): it
is about 10% each year, for 36 years − truly a notable share. However, also in this
case a difference should be stressed between the two phases when the expenditures
of the Cassa were higher, i.e. the second half of the 1950s (when they concentrated in
agriculture and the pre-conditions for industrialization) and the second half of the
1970s (when redistributive goals were, by now, prevailing). 
But what about the results? Before we discuss them in more detail, it is worth
contextualizing the North-South divide in the long term, within the overall historical
development of the Italian economy. To this scope, Figure 3 − taken from the latest
estimates of regional GDP for benchmark years at current borders 96 − may be illus-
trative: it shows as the North-South divide has been a constant in the history of uni -
fied Italy, but also that differences have not remained unchanged in the long-run. In
the liberal age regional imbalances were mild, while between the two world wars the
North-South gap remarkably widened. The economic miracle, from 1951 to 1971 −
but actually until 1973 − was the only period of convergence, limited though: as
compared to the Italian average (=100), the South went from 61 to 73. 97 This catch-
ing-up has come to a halt in the seventies and, as a result, southern Italy has begun to
fall back again, although at a very slow rate. In 2001, southern Italy still scores an in -
come per capita only slightly above two-thirds of the Italian average (68%); this has
remained more or less unchanged until our days (see forward, Table 3).98 
[Figure 3 here]
95 Felice, “Le politiche economiche,” 231.
96 Felice, “Italy;” but see also Daniele and Malanima, “Il prodotto,” and Felice, “Il Mezzogiorno.”
97 It is worth anticipating that this catching-up took place also in productivity (GDP per worker), even
at a speeder rate than in GDP per capita, especially in the industrial sector: see Felice, “Regional value
added,” 937–940, and forward Table 3.
98 And actually, according to Svimez, the last economic crisis has affected more heavily the
Mezzogiorno than the Centre-North: Svimez, Rapporto, 3−86.
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The convergence of the economic miracle is, therefore, an unprecedented event
in the history of unified Italy, and unique it has remained thus far: although largely
incomplete, in some respects it was remarkable, not least because during the eco -
nomic miracle also the Centre-North was growing, as never before. The sheer fact
that southern Italy was able to keep up with the Centre-North in the very years of
fastest economic growth of this latter, must be considered as a major achievement.
Actually, to some foreign observers the strong impact of the Cassa was clear already
in the 1950s, when it concentrated on agriculture and the pre-requisites for industrial -
ization: ‘To some extent − wrote Carey and Carey as early as in 1955 − the Cassa has
changed the face of the South. Where there was formerly dry land, there are now vast
irrigation projects under way. Thousands of acres of swampland, cleared of malaria
by the Allied forces, UNRRA, and the Rockefeller Foundation working in conjunc -
tion with the Italian government, and kept clear with Cassa funds, are now used for
cultivation and human habitation; hundreds of miles of roads, many of them difficult
engineering feats, now connect towns which formerly were entirely isolated; thou -
sands of acres of reforestation are now visible where formerly there was nothing but
barren erosion’.99 Available archival sources confirm the dramatically backward con-
ditions of southern towns – for example throughout the provinces of Abruzzi, one of
the poorest areas at the beginning of the extraordinary intervention 100 – along with
the positive effects of the Cassa’s direct interventions for what concerns agricul-
99 Carey and Carey, “The South,” 587.
100 ‘Almost primitive living conditions’ (condizioni quasi primitive) were, for instance, those of the
rural populations in the province of Pescara: ASP (Archivio di Stato di Pescara), Relazione, p. 2. For
the appalling situation of some roads, see ASP (Archivio di Stato di Pescara), GC, sez. I, S.g., b. 2;
ACS (Archivio Centrale dello Stato), MI, Gab., b. 59, f. 13.005/1, Aquila.
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ture,101 the construction of roads,102 and aqueducts103 and drainage works.104 Later on,
a highly favourable judgement about the first phase of the Cassa has been expressed,
among other historians, by Leandra D’Antone, who defined it the ‘happiest phase of
the extraordinary intervention’.105 As we are going to see, it is, however, the entire
first half of the extraordinary intervention, including the industrialization of the
1960s, that should be positively regarded, at least for what concerns the convergence
of the South. This has come to be recognized by several Italian scholars, including
Salvatore Cafiero, Adriano Giannola, Augusto Graziani, Carlo Trigilia, and Vera Za-
magni.106 
The assessment of these scholars may now find support in the quantitative recon -
struction presented in this article. In the 1960s, convergence went along with a signi-
ficant increase in the expenditures of the extraordinary intervention and − what is
even more noticeable − of those aimed more directly to industrialization. Thanks to
the 1957 law and to the investment reservations imposed on State-owned enterprises,
the industrial sector of the South, that in the early fifties still was modest in size and
technologically backward, was both expanded and transformed. We can be more pre-
cise on this, by looking at Table 3. It shows the evolution of key macroeconomic in-
dicators in benchmark years (1951, 1971, 1991, 2011): GDP per capita, which in turn
is formed by the product of GDP per worker (labour productivity) and by ‘workers
per capita’ (the activity rate); the table also displays a breakdown by sectors (in -
101 ACS (Archivio Centrale dello Stato), MI, Gab., b. 61, f. 1.315, Aquila.
102 ACS (Archivio Centrale dello Stato), MI, Gab., b. 59, f. 13.005/4, Aquila; ACS (Archivio Centrale
dello Stato), MI, Gab., b. 97, f. 3.061/1, Teramo; ACS (Archivio Centrale dello Stato), MI, Gab., b.
79, f. 3.005/7, Aquila.
103 ACS (Archivio Centrale dello Stato), MI, Gab., b. 79, f. 3.005/1, Aquila.
104 ACS (Archivio Centrale dello Stato), MI, Gab., b. 71, f. 13.079/1, Teramo, Promemoria della ci-
ttà di Teramo, 1; see also Formosa, “Le fognature,” 444.
105 In the original Italian: ‘la fase più felice dell’intervento straordinario’. D’Antone,
“«Straordinarietà»,” 603.
106 Cafiero, Tradizione e attualità, 110; Giannola, Industria, 19−30; Graziani, I conti, 178−179, who
expresses a «fully positive appraisal»; Trigilia, Sviluppo, 38−40; Zamagni, Dalla periferia, 470−471. 
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dustry, agriculture and services), with respect to both labour productivity and the al -
location of the labour force.
As can be seen, from 1951 to 1971 most of the southern convergence is due not
so much to an expansion of the industrial base (which however did occur, in absolute
terms), but rather to an increase in industrial productivity: a direct result of the
Cassa’s top-down strategy, which financed capital intensive sectors and then lifted up
GDP per worker. In contrast, there is no convergence in the activity rates, suggesting
that instead the massive emigration from South to North played a minor role (assum -
ing than those emigrating did not have a job at home). On the other side, it is worth
noticing that from 1951 to 1971 the abandonment of the agrarian sector was in the
South, in absolute terms, a slightly higher than in the rest of the country: -26.4 per-
centage points, against an Italian average of -25.8. It is true that this gap widened in
the following two decades, thus it is possible that the initial Cassa’s engagement in
agriculture somehow delayed structural change − of the labour force from agriculture
to industry and services − in southern Italy. But it was a modest delay, nonetheless.
What is more important, it went along a convergence of the South also in per capita
productivity of agriculture (from 80 to 88% of the Italian average): this was much
more pronounced in the 1950s and 1960s, than in the following two decades, and
should be regarded as one more important achievement of the extraordinary interven -
tion. From the early seventies onwards, the figures confirm what we have discussed
above, namely that this positive path came to a halt with the oil crisis, which marked
the failure of those development schemes: in GDP per capita, southern Italy began to
lose ground, its falling back being mainly due to a decrease in activity rates, i.e. to
the lack of job opportunities. By that time, regional policy seems to have turned
powerless: although the expenses did not decrease, they could no longer help to con-
verge, mainly because they were drifting away from productive uses. Things further
worsened in the 1980s, when also the funds from regional policy began to decrease.
Not surprisingly, as a result of the extension of unproductive and welfare interven-
tions, in these decades the employment share of the tertiary sector remarkably in -
creased: in 1991 and 2011 it is above the Italian average, while the share of industry
is remarkably below.
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[Table 3 here]
5. Towards a regional breakdown
Within the overall picture we have outlined thus far, the regional differences in
the extraordinary intervention deserve a more in-depth consideration. With regard to
direct interventions, Table 4 shows the distribution of the works contracted up to the
end of 1975, according to their main typologies and different periods (1950-1965,
1966-1970, 1971-1975). In the allocation of funds, some regions have been propor-
tionally more favoured: these were Molise, Lucania, Sardinia, to a minor degree Ab -
ruzzi and Calabria; while in Lucania and Sardinia, however, reclamations and moun-
tain settlements − in the agricultural sector − were predominant,107 in the other three
the Cassa focused instead, more than anywhere else, in the construction of roads and
(particularly in Abruzzi and Molise) in aqueducts and sewage systems.108
[Table 4 here]
The industrial subsidies (Table 5) have a different allocation. In the fifties, the re-
gions which received the largest share were Campania, where some industrial tradi-
tion was already present, and Sicily, namely the area of Syracuse where the petro-
chemical pole would take shape.109 In the sixties the most favoured regions were in-
stead Apulia and Sardinia, above all for what concerns the heavy industries: chemic -
als in Sardinia, chemicals and iron and steel in Apulia; however,  in the sixties we can
find investments in these sectors practically in every region, with the exception of
107 In addition to our elaborations in Table 4, more comments on this can be found in the yearly re-
ports of the Cassa: e.g. Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio II semestre 1965, 32−39; Id., Bilancio
1970, 34−67; Id., Bilancio 1975. Appendice statistica, 105−142.
108 Id., Bilancio II semestre 1965, 12−23; Id., Bilancio 1970, 13-33; Id., Bilancio 1975. Appendice
statistica, 157−178.
109 Id., Bilancio 1959-60, 148-168.
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Abruzzi and Molise, where they remained exceptionally low.110 The next decade is
characterized by the fact that, following the big state-owned enterprises, also the
private big business − in order to have the Cassa’s aids, but also to minimize con-
flicts with trade unions111 − began to invest in the South: the first and by far most im-
portant one was Fiat, which diversified with some success in Sicily (the Termini
Imerese plant in 1970), Molise (Termoli, same year),112 Abruzzi (Val di Sangro,
1978)113 and later on in Lucania (Melfi, early 1990s).114 It is not a coincidence that
these were to be the regions attracting the lion’s share of funds in the last period, as
confirmed by the available data on the grants received up to the end of 1985. 115 In the
most critical phase of the extraordinary intervention, and at a time when the Cassa’s
subsidies more strongly directed toward small-medium enterprises and light indus -
trial sectors, in those smaller regions some beginning of a virtuous circle can be ob -
served;116 it was the opposite of what occurred with the biggest regions, where in-
stead we should talk of a vicious circle. Abruzzi is no doubt the best example of this
(relative) success, up to the point that from 1987 to 1989 this small region received
about one-third of total industrial incentives;117 but it contrasts with the dismal failure
of the biggest areas of the Mezzogiorno.
[Table 5 here]
The Cassa’s yearly reports confirm that, in the sixties, in Abruzzi and Molise the
agency favoured small-medium enterprises and light sectors. The reasons were
mainly demographical − the low density and high dispersion of towns and villages −
110 Id., Bilancio 1970, 68−100.
111 Bianchi, La rincorsa, 145−169.
112 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1970, 71.
113 Id., Bilancio 1978, 48.
114 Agenzia per la promozione dello sviluppo del Mezzogiorno, Conto consuntivo 1992, 84−87.
115 Besides the data in Table 5, see also Intervento straordinario nel Mezzogiorno, Commissario del
Governo, Bilancio 1985, 53−58, 99−110, 119−125. 
116 Felice, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, 214−227; Id., “The ‘Cassa per il Mezzogiorno’ in the Abruzzi.”
117 Servidio, “Gli investimenti industriali.”
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although in other territories demography was not a decisive constraint: Sardinia was
similar to Abruzzi by this regard, but it witnessed nonetheless a remarkable expan-
sion of big chemical factories,118 which in the course of the seventies broke down.119
From our perspective, what really matters is that these differences in the regional
policy resulted in different patterns of per capita GDP and its components.  This is
clear from Table 6. For what concerns the sectoral components of GDP, we may no -
tice as the remarkable growth of southern Italy in the 1960s took place not only in  in-
dustry, but also in agriculture (and contrasting with the dismal performance of this
sector in the 1970s, when the Cassa’s engagement in agriculture was de facto aban-
doned): at the regional level, in this latter the best performing regions are those −
Apulia, Sardinia, Sicily − which in 1966-1970 received the largest amount of Cassa’s
direct interventions in agriculture (cfr. Table 4).120 In the 1970s, we still have a good
growth of industrial GDP in some regions (Abruzzi, Molise, Sicily) which continued
to benefit from the extraordinary intervention in industry. In terms of aggregate GDP,
it is worth noticing that both Abruzzi and Molise accelerated their convergence in the
seventies, when instead the rest of the South began to fall back. Sardinia had grown
considerably in the sixties, at the time of top-down investments, but then it fell back
dramatically, in correspondence with the oil crisis which struck heavily those same
subsidized plants. Abruzzi continued to converge throughout the eighties, but then
the extraordinary intervention came to an end, and indeed soon after also the
European funds did (in 1995 Abruzzi is also the first region to leave the Objective 1
areas): as a consequence, by 2001 the region has begun to diverge again.  Molise and
Lucania, both smaller than Abruzzi, continued to converge also in more recent years:
the former, thanks to the expansion of public administration and to the good perform -
ance of the Fiat plant in Termoli; the latter, once again, thanks to Fiat, which between
118 Useful notes about the strategy of industrialization of Southern Italy before the oil shocks, and on
the different regional paths, can be found in Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1968, 96−140; Id.,
Bilancio 1969, 161−171; Id., Bilancio 1970, 86−100; Id., Bilancio 1971, 83−93.
119 Petriccione, L’industrializzazione tradita, 18−19; Ruju, La parabola. 
120 In addition to the figures in Table 4, see also the comments in Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio
1966, 41−59; Id., Bilancio 1967, 48−80; Id., Bilancio 1968, 40−95; Id., Bilancio 1969, 85−160; Id.,
Bilancio 1970, 34−67.
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1991 and 1993 built a new plant in Melfi that was the largest investment in the South
since the end of the extraordinary intervention, and benefitted from European and na-
tional subsidies.121 In other words, like it or not the government intervention has con-
tinued to be the salvation (and damnation) of the Southern regions.
[Table 6 here]
6. Conclusions
In the course of its unitary history, Italy has experienced an economic rise that
turned it into one of the major industrial powers on the planet. Nevertheless, the
problem of the South has remained unresolved. The North-South divide went grow -
ing during the long industrial take-off and, after the only phase of convergence in the
‘golden age’ (1951-1973), it has remained virtually unchanged during the last four
decades; indeed, it even has begun to slowly grow again. In view of these long-term
trends, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the massive regional policies
carried out by Cassa per il Mezzogiorno from the 1950s to the 1980s, which at that
time, in terms of funds allocated as a share of GDP and sectors covered, has no paral-
lels in other Western countries. To the present, however, the available international
literature about the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno looks incomplete: on the one side, we
have early analyses focusing on the remarkable Cassa’s engagement in the agricul-
tural sector in the 1950s;122 on the other one, we have more recent studies stressing
the ineffectiveness and poorness of the Cassa’s industrial policy since the 1970s. 123 A
missing link, in this picture, has been the Cassa’s industrial engagement of the 1960s,
which followed and completed the ‘pre-requisites phase’ of the 1950s (which re-
garded not only agriculture, but also infrastructures), and was the central part of a
121 Chiarello and Corigliano, Industria.
122 Carey and Carey, “The South;” Carlyle, The Awakening. 
123 Spadavecchia, “Regional and National.”
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wider commitment of Italian ruling élites − coming from different cultural and polit -
ical backgrounds − since the end of World War II in favour of the development of
southern Italy.
In this article, we have reviewed the history of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and
reconstructed its activities, at the aggregate level as well as by regions and main ex -
penditure invoices. By taking advantage of the Cassa’s yearly reports, we have
strived to produce an unprecedented detailed overview of the Cassa’s activity,
through its different historical phases, allowing us to highlight both its early suc-
cesses and subsequent failures, and to provide better evidence for a crucial and cent -
ral phase of its history − the 1960s. According to our quantitative reconstruction, the
initial focus of the Cassa on agriculture was a little overestimated by Carlyle, 124 who
based her analysis on budget plans rather than on actual expenses, although it re -
mains true that in its first years the Cassa mainly centered on the primary sector. Res -
ults confirm the favourable appraisal by Carey and Carey,125 as well as the more re-
cent one by other Italian scholars,126 about the early period; concerning the last phase,
we also find confirmation of the criticism by Spadavecchia, 127 and other scholars
such as Cafiero128 and Trigilia.129 Actually, we are now able to put these studies −
both the favourable and the critical ones −  into a wider historical perspective, with
respect to the internal evolution of the Cassa and its role in the economic history of
contemporary Italy. Namely, we find that the policy guidelines of the extraordinary
intervention have been observed only until the sixties; also, we bring evidence of the
fact that in this decade the Cassa’s engagement in favour of industry was effective
and, in its way, successful. Considering the input endowment of southern Italy (rich
in labour, but poor in capital), Federico and Giannetti defined the Cassa’s industrial
strategy of the 1960s, based on highly capital intensive firms, as an ‘effective but
124 The Awakening.
125 “The South.”
126 E.g. D’Antone, “«Straordinarietà»,” 603 and passim.
127 “Regional and National.”
128 Cafiero, Questione meridionale, 207-215. 
129 Trigilia, Sviluppo.
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hardly an efficient one.’130 We may agree on this judgement, but after adding two im-
portant qualifications: first, in the 1960s Italy was growing at an unprecedented rate
and there was no reason to think that the fundamentals of growth were bound to
change soon (thus, the worries for efficiency could legitimately be overlooked);
second, this activity had, nonetheless, a long-lasting positive impact, up to the point
that those plants have remained, until our days, the most significant part of the
Southern industrial fabric.131 In this respect, our re-assessment of the Cassa’s inter-
vention in favour of southern Italy in the 1960s is similar to the one recently pro -
posed by De la Torre and García Zúñiga for the Spanish regional policies in the same
period,132 or by Margairaz for the French national plans:133 in all of these cases, top-
down incentive schemes were a ‘necessary evil’, in order to bring investments from
large companies to underdeveloped territories. 
In the next period, from the early seventies to the dissolution of the Cassa, a mis -
match occurred between stated goals and actions − or resources (and, of course,
achievements) − and as a consequence the Cassa’s activities went lost amid a variety
of indiscriminate activities, without a strategic vision. In the eighties, the extraordin-
ary intervention reduced its intensity, but it did not lose the nepotistic traits acquired
in the previous decade. However, also during the 1970s and partly the 1980s, in the
demographically smaller southern regions we may observe a positive contribution of
the Cassa’s industrial aids to their convergence; and in this case too, it is worth noti -
cing that the Cassa’s financed plants today remain the most important industrial
activities for these territories.
To sum up, when we come to the impact of the Cassa on the economy of south-
ern Italy, we find it hard to overestimate, both in positive and (later on) in negative
terms. Not only there is a clear correspondence between the period of greater effect -
iveness of the agency and the convergence of the South, but also the way in which
130 Federico and Giannetti, “Italy,” 140.
131 In important regions such as Apulia, Campania, Sicily. E.g. Pirro and Guarini (eds.), Grande in-
dustria e Mezzogiorno, also for what follows about the Cassa’s legacy in the smaller regions (above
all Abruzzi and Molise). See also Quadro Curzio and Fortis (eds.), L’economia reale.
132 De la Torre and García-Zúñiga, “El impacto a largo plazo,” 51.
133 Margaraiz, Les Plans.
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this convergence was achieved − through a more rapid growth of the agrarian sector
and then an impressive rise in industrial productivity − corroborates the argument
about the decisive role played by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno during the economic
miracle, that is in the 1950s and 1960s. In a specular manner, the dismal performance
of southern Italy in the 1970s and 1980s is closely linked to the loss of effectiveness
of the extraordinary intervention. Within this general framework, we also point to the
presence of significant regional differences. Even the single regional patterns of con-
vergence or divergence, in fact, should be put in connection with the extraordinary
intervention and its effectiveness: the interrupted growth of the major Southern re -
gions (Campania, Puglia, Sicily, Calabria); the rise and then the fall of Sardinia; by
contrast, the relative success of Abruzzi and, later on, of Molise and Basilicata. A fur -
ther study and comparison of these regional cases will help us to shed more light on
the unfulfilled potential of the extraordinary intervention. Similarly, a more in-depth
study of the internal functioning of the Cassa and the evolution of its structure, which
would complement the information from the Cassa’s reports with that from other
sources (such as the Cassa’s archives, still to be reordered and opened up to the pub -
lic)134 would help to put more flesh on the bone of our outline − and, possibly, on
how the extraordinary intervention could have been improved and how it failed in-
stead.
134 For the state of the art of the Cassa’s archives, see Carucci, “L’archivio.”
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Table 1. Expenditures of the «Cassa per il Mezzogiorno» in Southern Italy, from 1951 to
1986 (2011 million euros)
Years Direct interven-
tionsa
Grants and soft
loansb
Other interven-
tionsc
Total Expenditures/
investm.d(%)
Exp./
GDP
2011
mln eur
%  of the
whole
2011
mln eur
%  of the
whole
2011
mln eur
%  of the
whole
2011
mln eur South Italy %
1951 627 98.8 4 0.6 4 0.6 634 5.36 1.39 0.28
1952 1113 95.5 28 2.4 24 2.1 1166 8.75 2.40 0.49
1953 1649 90.7 65 3.6 104 5.7 1818 11.51 3.40 0.72
1954 2241 89.5 94 3.8 168 6.7 2503 15.20 4.37 0.95
1955 2051 82.8 116 4.7 310 12.5 2476 12.56 3.77 0.88
1956 1671 75.7 138 6.2 398 18.1 2207 11.29 3.25 0.75
1957 1594 75.9 168 8.0 338 16.1 2100 10.22 2.79 0.67
1951-57
total 10944  614  1346  12904   
Yearly
average 1563 84.8 88 4.8 192 10.4 1843 10.70 3.05 0.69
1958 1578 59.3 208 7.8 875 32.9 2661 12.87 3.65 0.81
1959 1708 60.5 270 9.5 846 30.0 2823 13.14 3.59 0.80
1960 1684 66.7 353 14.0 489 19.4 2527 9.96 2.81 0.67
1961 1727 61.0 431 15.2 674 23.8 2831 9.81 2.78 0.70
1962 1745 57.7 460 15.2 819 27.1 3024 9.27 2.75 0.70
1963 1566 53.3 459 15.6 914 31.1 2938 7.70 2.48 0.64
1964 1419 47.0 738 24.4 862 28.5 3018 7.99 2.73 0.63
1965 1419 44.5 910 28.5 860 27.0 3189 9.72 3.29 0.64
1958-65
total 12845  3828  6338  23012   
Yearly
average 1606 55.8 478 16.6 792 27.5 2876 10.06 3.01 0.69
1966 1281 52.0 659 26.8 521 21.2 2461 7.35 2.45 0.46
1967 1449 45.5 1072 33.6 665 20.9 3185 8.34 2.82 0.55
1968 1639 41.9 1170 29.9 1106 28.2 3916 9.61 3.21 0.63
1969 1781 39.9 1409 31.6 1273 28.5 4464 9.33 3.20 0.68
1970 2263 40.3 2326 41.4 1031 18.3 5620 10.44 3.64 0.80
1966-70
total 8413  6637  4596  19646   
Yearly
average 1683 42.8 1327 33.8 919 23.4 3929 9.01 3.06 0.64
1971 2659 55.6 1236 25.8 890 18.6 4784 8.74 3.25 0.67
1972 2864 47.3 1909 31.5 1284 21.2 6058 11.03 4.13 0.82
1973 2706 45.3 2567 43.0 696 11.7 5969 9.73 3.24 0.75
1974 3858 55.8 2410 34.9 642 9.3 6910 9.61 3.12 0.82
1975 5317 57.1 3143 33.8 851 9.1 9311 15.02 5.39 1.13
1971-75
total 17404  11265  4362  33031   
Yearly
average 3481 52.7 2253 34.1 872 13.2 6606 10.83 3.83 0.84
1976 5355 63.2 2384 28.2 730 8.6 8469 12.06 4.06 0.96
50
1977 5813 68.0 2148 25.1 594 6.9 8555 12.84 4.33 0.95
1978 5620 67.8 2167 26.1 504 6.1 8291 12.60 4.11 0.89
1979 4635 63.6 2082 28.6 574 7.9 7292 10.18 3.34 0.74
1980 4595 69.2 1485 22.3 565 8.5 6645 8.86 2.70 0.65
1976-80
total 26018  10266  2967  39251   
Yearly
average 5204 66.3 2053 26.2 593 7.6 7850 11.30 3.71 0.83
1981 4647 70.9 1347 20.6 561 8.6 6556 8.89 2.86 0.64
1982 4264 70.9 1183 19.7 568 9.4 6015 8.03 2.69 0.58
1983 6428 80.6 1185 14.9 360 4.5 7973 10.45 3.75 0.76
1984 5369 76.0 1274 18.0 420 5.9 7064 8.83 3.07 0.65
1985 4261 69.3 1280 20.8 606 9.9 6147 7.89 2.60 0.55
1986 3584 65.4 1447 26.4 451 8.2 5481 7.18 2.37 0.48
1981-86
total 28552  7716  2967  39235   
Yearly
average 4759 72.8 1286 19.7 494 7.6 6539 8.55 2.89 0.61
a General and sector-specific infrastructures, plus other minor interventions (railroads, school construction,
education and professional training, development assistance, research and development, various).
b Subsidies to entrepreneurs (grants to agriculture, industry, tourism, craftsmanship, fishing; subsidized
credit to industry, aids for the workers’ houses).
c Financial aids with funds from the extraordinary intervention and foreign expenses, operational expenses
of the Cassa and the Minister for extraordinary interventions in the South. 
d Total gross investments.
Source: our elaborations from: Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1950-51…1984, Intervento straordinario
nel Mezzogiorno, Commissario del Governo, Bilancio 1985 and Bilancio 1986, Lepore, “Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno,” and various estimates from SVIMEZ (Cafiero and Marciani, “Quarant’anni;” Marciani, “La
spesa della Cassa;” SVIMEZ, 150 anni); total gross investments are from SVIMEZ, 150 anni; current-price
data have been transformed into 2011 euros, with the use of Istat (“Il valore”) price deflators; the Italian
GDP is from Felice and Vecchi (“Italy’s Growth”) (GDP per capita in 2011 euros, which was transformed in
total GDP using the Istat’s series of the resident population). A previous version of this table (without the
columns Expenditures/Investments) was already published in Italian, in Felice and Lepore (“Le politiche di
sviluppo,” 614−616; “Intervento pubblico,” 254–255). 
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Table 2. Direct interventions of the «Cassa per il Mezzogiorno»: works contracted
up to the end of 1975 (share of the total) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1951 98.3 1.7 - - - - - - - -
1952 40.3 16.9 42.2 0.6 - - - - - -
1953 58.3 15.6 23.8 2.3 - - - - - -
1954 50.7 14.2 21.4 4.1 9.6 - - - - -
1955 33.9 27.5 6.8 2.3 29.5 - - - - -
1956 56.7 13.3 10.6 3.6 15.8 - - - - -
1957 51.1 23.0 9.7 4.2 12.0 - - - - -
Yearly average 55.5 17.5 15.3 2.7 9.0 - - - - -
1958 55.0 27.7 8.2 4.2 4.9 - - - - -
1959 50.1 23.2 13.9 2.9 9.9 - - - - -
1960 45.3 22.5 17.0 4.2 11.1 - - - - -
1961 59.7 19.9 13.6 5.2 1.5 - - - - -
1962 58.0 24.4 10.3 4.4 3.0 - - - - -
1963 50.6 29.6 8.6 6.0 5.2 - - - 0.1 -
1964 49.9 23.5 18.8 4.7 2.0 0.8 0.3 - 3.7 -
1965 36.1 14.9 23.6 4.9 2.8 7.2 7.7 2.8 7.7 -
Yearly average 46.2 22.6 14.6 4.4 2.5 5.0 1.9 0.7 2.2 -
1966 28.1 26.5 13.7 3.4 5.4 7.6 12.3 3.0 6.6 -
1967 32.4 27.8 23.8 3.1 2.2 3.2 7.0 0.4 0.9 -
1968 43.7 27.0 16.0 3.2 0.3 2.9 6.6 0.3 0.4 -
1969 31.2 36.5 19.6 3.6 0.5 5.9 2.6 0.1 5.6 -
1970 36.6 28.7 17.6 5.1 1.4 6.3 4.1 0.1 6.4 -
Yearly average 32.5 26.4 20.5 3.6 4.5 0.9 5.6 0.2 5.8 -
1971 28.7 20.0 31.6 4.1 0.6 11.5 3.4 0.2 17.4 -
1972 38.9 28.9 17.8 4.2 0.6 8.3 1.2 0.2 41.6 -
1973 36.6 18.2 31.9 7.2 0.2 3.3 2.0 0.8 27.7 -
1974 25.6 29.9 19.0 3.2 0.1 5.5 1.1 0.3 12.5 15.2
1975 21.6 20.0 21.1 2.6 - 10.3 1.4 0.2 27.9 22.9
Yearly average 22.4 20.5 16.5 3.3 1.4 0.1 4.7 0.2 19.8 11.0
Notes: net of the lowest bid auctions; the yearly average has been re-scaled to the total 100.
Legend: (1) reclamations and mountain settlements; (2) aqueducts and sewage systems; (3) ordinary
roads; (4) touristic works; (5) railroads; (6) ports and airports; (7) civilian hospitals; (8) public works
in areas struck by earthquake; (9) infrastructures for industrial areas and nuclei; (10) regional special
projects. Source: elaborations from: Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio. 1950-51…1975.
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Table 3. GDP per capita, employment and productivity in Italy and Southern Italy,
1951-2011
1951 1971 1991 2011 1951 1971 1991 2011
GDP per capita, Southern Italy
(Italy = 100)
GDP per capita, Italy
(2011 euros)
60.7 73.0 71.2 68.1 4,813 13,268 23,141 26,065
Activity rates GDP per worker
South and islands
(Italy = 100) 89.2 86.7 80.3 76.9 68.9 84.1 87.5 88.5
Italy 
(%, 2011 euros) 42.1 37.1 41.3 39.6 15,106 35,925 55,486 65,743
Sectoral employment: agriculture GDP per worker: agriculture 
South and islands
(%, Italy = 100) 59.2 32.8 14.1 8.8 80.1 87.7 91.4 87.2
Italy 
(%, 2011 euros) 44.6 18.8 8.4 5.1 9,064 16,166 24,414 29,584
Sectoral employment: industry GDP per worker: industry 
South and islands
(%, Italy = 100) 16.3 26.5 22.4 20.0 64.3 88.9 91.2 84.1
Italy 
(%, 2011 euros) 26.8 38.1 30.5 26.1 19,336 35,207 55,486 61,798
Sectoral employment: services GDP per worker: services 
South and islands
(%, Italy = 100) 24.5 40.8 63.5 71.2 82.8 94.1 89.0 91.8
Italy 
(%, 2011 euros) 28.6 43.1 61.0 68.8 19,940 45,266 59,925 69,688
Source: Felice, “Regional value added,” for 1951 and 1971; for 1991, elaborations from CRENoS, “Re-
gio-It 1970-2004;” for 2011, elaborations from Istat, “Conti economici;” for GDP per capita and GDP
per worker, national figures are from Felice and Vecchi, “Italy’s Growth.”
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Table 4. Direct interventions of the «Cassa per il Mezzogiorno»: works contracted
at the regional level (thousand euros at current prices)
Total Share
works/ share
populat.
of which (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
until to the end of 1965
Abruzzi 42,739 1.13 43.0 26.0 23.2 5.7 0.5 1.6 0.0 0.0
Molise 30,708 2.75 32.7 34.6 30.9 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Campania 107,566 0.69 37.0 38.1 12.8 8.6 1.4 0.1 2.1 0.0
Apulia 66,204 0.60 67.8 9.4 12.9 3.7 3.5 2.8 0.0 0.0
Lucania 72,565 3.60 68.5 11.2 18.6 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0
Calabria 80,279 1.24 46.8 30.7 17.5 1.7 1.2 2.1 0.0 0.0
Sicily 111,588 0.72 53.6 20.5 18.8 5.8 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sardinia 90,042 1.96 68.1 14.9 12.0 2.1 0.9 2.1 0.0 0.0
Total 601,691 1.00 53.4 22.9 16.8 4.2 1.3 1.1 0.4 0.0
from 1966 to 1970
Abruzzi 38,453 1.30 18.5 29.1 22.0 8.5 5.3 4.0 0.0 12.5
Molise 28,384 3.51 33.1 15.1 49.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Campania 70,098 0.53 23.5 37.7 19.4 5.2 4.9 3.3 1.3 4.8
Apulia 66,395 0.72 44.2 13.9 9.8 4.9 2.7 6.9 0.0 17.7
Lucania 68,810 4.65 27.3 28.4 32.5 1.7 0.5 1.5 0.0 8.2
Calabria 51,941 1.06 20.8 40.4 16.5 3.9 4.8 13.3 0.0 0.3
Sicily 101,392 0.84 38.3 24.6 15.9 1.7 3.8 12.1 0.0 3.6
Sardinia 59,382 1.56 40.2 22.6 12.1 2.9 6.1 5.1 0.0 11.0
Total 484,855 1.00 31.9 26.8 20.0 3.6 3.6 6.5 0.2 7.4
from 1971 to 1975
Abruzzi 89,458 1.19 11.1 31.7 30.7 3.4 4.0 4.0 0.0 15.1
Molise 67,373 3.27 12.1 25.7 50.9 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 8.7
Campania 244,481 0.73 17.7 35.7 17.6 5.4 3.7 2.9 1.2 15.8
Apulia 198,465 0.84 21.5 20.0 16.0 5.3 0.9 2.0 0.0 34.2
Lucania 107,970 2.86 38.9 26.7 24.2 2.1 2.0 0.1 0.0 6.0
Calabria 172,604 1.37 17.4 33.1 7.0 2.3 1.7 17.9 0.0 20.7
Sicily 206,186 0.67 35.2 18.5 14.9 4.6 0.8 6.5 0.0 19.6
Sardinia 150,490 1.55 27.2 18.8 11.1 2.5 1.4 7.5 0.0 31.5
Total 1,237,027 1.00 23.4 26.3 18.0 3.8 1.9 5.7 0.2 20.7
Notes: net of the lowest bid auctions and of other contribution; for the works contracted until the end
of 1965, the share of population is the one in 1961, for those in 1966-1970 and in 1971-1975 is the
one in 1971.
Legend: (1) reclamations and mountain settlements; (2) aqueducts and sewage systems; (3) ordinary
roads; (4) touristic works; (5) civilian hospitals; (6) ports and airports; (7) public works in areas
struck by earthquake; (8) infrastructures for industrial areas and nuclei. Railroads are not included
since they refer to more than one region and from the Cassa’s reports they were impossible to separ -
ate.
Source: our elaborations from Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio II semestre 1965, 266; Id., Bilancio
1970, 348; Id., Bilancio 1975. Appendice statistica, 222−223.
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Table 5. Cassa per il Mezzogiorno: subsidies to industry, 1951-1985 (thousand
euros at current prices)
Soft loans, 1951-61 Soft loans, 1962-68 Grants up to 31/12/1985
Total Iron and steel
and chemicals
(%)
Share
loans/share
pop. (1951)
Total Iron and steel
and chemicals
(%)
Share
loans/share
pop. (1961)
Total Share
loans/share
pop. (1961)
Abruzzi and Molise 14,045 6.96 0.721 72,077 10.36 0.622 347,900 2.054
Campania 69,885 17.67 1.347 362,785 47.33 0.980 607,639 1.008
Apulia 13,113 12.80 0.341 370,960 71.61 1.412 491,141 1.155
Lucania 5,047 2.04 0.681 41,628 71.44 0.870 61,159 0.945
Calabria 9,134 26.89 0.383 32,745 31.48 0.213 139,563 0.638
Sicily 85,426 61.48 1.599 314,994 73.51 0.857 312,778 0.582
Sardinia 13,105 11.32 0.858 231,265 72.44 2.123 233,855 1.327
Total 209,756 34.12 1.000 1,426,454 61.97 1.000 2,194,035 1.000
Source: Cassa, Bilancio 1961-62 and Bilancio 1969; Svimez, Gli investimenti industriali; Intervento 
straordinario nel Mezzogiorno, Commissario del Governo, Bilancio 1985, 919−922.
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Table 6. GDP and its components in the regions of Southern Italy, 1951-
2011 
Relative GDP per capita (Italy=100)
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
Abruzzi 58.1 67.0 82.8 86.6 88.7 84.7 85.0
Molise - 60.8 69.7 74.3 73.0 83.0 77.7
Campania 69.2 71.4 71.2 66.8 70.4 65.3 63.9
Apulia 65.0 68.3 75.1 72.3 73.9 67.1 67.6
Lucania 47.1 58.8 74.9 68.4 60.0 72.8 71.0
Calabria 46.9 54.7 66.7 64.3 59.7 64.3 65.0
Sicily 58.1 58.7 70.1 67.8 69.7 66.0 66.2
Sardinia 63.0 72.1 84.8 71.1 76.5 76.2 77.3
South and is-
lands 60.7 64.9 73.0 70.5 71.2 68.1 68.1
Italy 
(2011 euros) 4,813 8,158 13,268 18,202 23,141 27,113 26,065
Yearly growth rates of total GDP and its components (%)
1961-
1971
1971-
1981
1981-
1991
1961-
1971
1971-
1981
1981-
1991
Abruzzi Agric. 1.71 0.90 0.09 Serv. 5.83 4.46 3.16
Ind. 9.03 3.22 4.06 GDP 5.45 3.88 3.01
Molise Agric. 0.28 -0.89 1.35 Serv. 5.93 4.50 2.93
Ind. 5.31 5.95 3.25 GDP 3.58 4.34 2.52
Campania Agric. 3.43 0.57 0.28 Serv. 6.00 4.12 3.11
Ind. 5.50 1.72 2.79 GDP 5.58 3.15 2.79
Apulia Agric. 3.63 0.19 1.89 Serv. 6.40 4.25 3.22
Ind. 8.51 2.77 2.62 GDP 6.67 3.26 2.99
Lucania Agric. 1.91 0.00 1.27 Serv. 6.21 2.90 2.79
Ind. 7.96 0.72 1.02 GDP 5.23 2.02 1.87
Calabria Agric. 1.25 -0.31 1.07 Serv. 6.69 3.37 1.87
Ind. 7.67 1.38 1.13 GDP 5.43 2.94 1.43
Sicilia Agric. 3.36 -0.13 2.32 Serv. 5.91 3.44 2.71
Ind. 8.34 2.95 0.85 GDP 6.09 3.26 2.05
Sardinia Agric. 4.34 -3.35 1.60 Serv. 7.24 3.44 3.08
Ind. 7.55 -0.41 3.21 GDP 6.64 1.80 3.03
South and isl. Agric. 3.03 -0.12 1.43 Serv. 6.21 3.84 2.91
Ind. 7.40 2.13 2.30 GDP 5.93 3.10 2.54
Italy Agric. 1.10 0.80 1.09 Serv. 6.08 3.87 2.60
Ind. 5.77 3.26 2.16 GDP 5.27 3.53 2.28
Note: for 1951, Molise is included in Abruzzi. Source. For relative GDP per capita, Felice
and Vecchi, “Italy’s Growth,” until 2001; for 2011, Istat, “Conti economici.” For the
yearly growth rates of total GDP, our elaborations are from Crenos, “Regio-It 1960-
1996.” Data are at current prices for relative GDP per capita, at constant prices for the
yearly growth rates; reliable constant-price figures for the years before 1960 to be com -
parable with those for the following years, at the regional and sectoral level, are not avail -
able.
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Figure 1. Regions of Italy: areas in which Cassa per il Mezzogiorno functions
Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “The Development,” Map 1.
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Figure 2. Expenditures of the «Cassa per il Mezzogiorno» in Southern Italy, 1951-
1986, by different typologies (2011 million euros)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Direct
interventions
Grants and
soft loans
Other
interventions
Source: Elaborations from Table 1. For a similar graph (in 2008 million euros), see Lepore, “Cassa per
il Mezzogiorno e politiche per lo sviluppo,” 156.
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Figure 3. Regional imbalances in GDP per capita from Unification until our days, by
macro-areas (Italy = 1)
Source: Felice, “Italy.” Italy’s per capita GDP in 2011 euros (x-axis) is from Felice and Vecchi “Italy’s
Growth”. The benchmarks are the following: 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1938, 1951,
1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001. For a description of how the historical estimates are produced and a
discussion of their interpretation – in particular for what concerns the convergence of the 1950s and
1960s – see Felice (Il valore aggiunto; Divari regionali; “Regional Ddevelopment”; “Regional Value
Added”) and Felice and Vasta (“Passive Modernization”). This figure is at current regional borders.
For a similar figure, but at historical regional borders, see Felice and Vecchi, “Italy’s Modern,” 236
and Felice and Lepore, “Intervento pubblico,” 258.  
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